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THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT AND PROTECTION OF NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS PRACTICES
By
Jason Gubi*
INTRODUCTION
While there has been debate as to what the religion
clauses protect, nearly all observers would agree that the First
Amendment prohibits the federal government from establishing
a national religion.1 Yet, from 1882 to 1932, the federal government subsidized the conversion of Native Americans to Christianity, while simultaneously banning Native American spiritual
practices.2
Moreover, courts have treated Native American religions differently from “mainstream”3 Judeo-Christian religions
for much of this nation’s history. Beginning with Johnson v.
M’Intosh, the Supreme Court noted that the “character and religion” of the Native Americans stood in stark contrast to the
“superior genius of Europe,” helping to justify European control
of the land.4 In exchange, the Europeans gave the Native
Americans civilization and Christianity, believing this to be
“ample compensation.”5 M’Intosh’s view of the Native American religions as being somehow inferior to those of Western
Europe thus informs the Court’s subsequent unbalanced treatment of Native Americans in Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence.
This article will discuss the extent to which the Free
Exercise Clause creates rights to freely exercise religion for Native Americans in comparison with adherents of mainstream
religions and the effects, if any, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) has had on such rights.6 Section II of this
article examines the law governing Native American land use,
including the First Amendment, the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act (“AIRFA”), and the RFRA. Section III illustrates
some key issues arising in Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence
cases: (a) how central an asserted right must be for the courts to
recognize that the right must be protected from government action; (b) how substantial a burden on religion must be to be protected under RFRA; and (c) what constitutes a compelling government interest. Section IV reviews Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence in general, with an emphasis on Native American Free
Exercise Clause jurisprudence, to illustrate the difference in application of the clause to mainstream religions as opposed to
Native American religions. Section V analyzes and predicts the
manner in which Native American religious freedoms are protected, positing that although the law has historically provided
little protection for Native American religions, courts may now
be more receptive to securing Native American religious freedoms under RFRA.

THE LAW GOVERNING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
The free exercise of religion in the United States is secured first and foremost by the Bill of Rights. The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
…”7 Taken together, the Establishment and Free Exercise
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clauses prohibit the government from establishing a state religion and prevent the government from unduly restricting the exercise of religious freedoms.
Congress has also passed statutes to effectuate the purposes of the First Amendment with regard to religion. The
AIRFA protects Native Americans’ rights to “believe, express,
and exercise” their traditional religions, “including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and
the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional
rites.”8 The AIRFA initially offered only weak protection, however, and Congress had to amend the law in response to a landmark Supreme Court case concerning religious use of peyote.
In Employment Division v. Smith the Supreme Court
upheld a statute barring the use of peyote even for religious reasons. 9 The Court found that neutral, generally applicable laws
could be applied to religious practices even when they substantially burden the free exercise of religion and were not supported
by a compelling government interest. In response to Smith,
Congress amended the AIRFA to allow the use of peyote in religious rituals10 and passed the RFRA.11
The RFRA prohibits the government from substantially
burdening the free exercise of religion unless it can show a compelling interest, and accomplish its ends through the least restrictive means possible.12 Although the RFRA was found unconstitutional as applied to the states,13 it has been found constitutional
as applied to the federal government.14

GOVERNING PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL
APPLICATION OF THE RFRA
To determine whether the RFRA protects a right the
courts consider several key interests such as: (a) the central nature of the asserted right; (b) whether the burden on religion is
substantial; and (c) what constitutes a compelling government
interest. Courts sometimes analyze the centrality of an infringed
practice in determining the constitutionality of the governmental
action. RFRA defines exercise of religion as “any exercise of
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of
religious belief.”15 Section IV of this article, addresses the extent to which a given religious practice must be central to trigger
protection under the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA frameworks.
The RFRA only protects religious practices that are
substantially burdened by governmental action.16 Some of the
approaches courts have taken to analyze the substantiality of the
burden are: (a) making a case specific determination;17 (b) requiring coercion of a religious adherent;18 (c) assuming sufficiency of the asserted burden;19 and (d) requiring that an individual be prevented from engaging in religious conduct or having a
religious experience.20
Only compelling governmental interests can infringe
the free exercise of religion. The Supreme Court defines compelling interests as interests of “the highest order and not otherwise served.”21 Maintaining a uniform tax code,22 preserving
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Native American culture,23 protecting bald and golden eagles,24
and enforcing participation in the social security system25 are
examples of compelling governmental interests.

FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
This section will compare how courts have analyzed
Free Exercise claims in a number of different scenarios, highlighting the differences between the treatment received by adherents of Native American and mainstream religions.
GOVERNMENTAL BENEFITS
In Sherbert v. Verner, the Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of a South Carolina unemployment benefits
scheme which exempted people from benefits if they were able
to work but chose not to work.26 This scheme benefited Sunday
worshippers while indirectly burdening the free exercise of religion of non-Sunday Sabbath-worshippers. The Court, therefore, established a burden switching, or compelling burden
test.27 For an action to be constitutional, the government must
prove that it has a compelling interest in the regulation or action
and that the means of achieving this interest are the least restrictive possible.28 Under this test, the Court noted that non-Sunday
worshippers were forced to choose between taking the unemployment benefits and observing their religion.29 The Court
found such a choice repugnant under the Free Exercise Clause as
an undue burden on religious freedom.30
In Bowen v. Roy, the Court declined to apply the burden switching test that it had used in Sherbert.31 Native American recipients of welfare benefits, on behalf of their minor child,
objected to a government policy requiring the parents to submit
the child’s social security number in order to receive benefits.
The child’s father believed that the use of an arbitrary number as
a means of identification contradicted his religious convictions,
as it cut against an individual’s uniqueness.32 Though the Court
recognized that the test applied in cases like Sherbert would
seem to be applicable because an ostensibly neutral governmental policy was creating a burden on the free exercise of religious
practice, it declined to do so.
In Bowen, the court found a lesser burden upon a religious practice, and a higher governmental interest in enacting
the regulation.33 The Court distinguished government regulations that only “call[] for a choice between securing a governmental benefit and adhering to a religious belief[]…from governmental action or legislation that criminalizes religiously inspired activity or inescapably compels conduct that some find
objectionable for religious reasons.”34 Moreover, the Court reasoned that the Sherbert ruling may be viewed "as a protection
against unequal treatment rather than a grant of favored treatment for the members of the religious sect."35 Therefore, while
the Sherbert test was appropriate in cases involving unequal
treatment,36 there was no need for a more stringent test in Bowen.
The Court appears to favor Judeo-Christian
beliefs in determining whether or not to apply
the Sherbert test.
While the Court distinguished Bowen from Sherbert,
both instances involved a religious adherent who had to choose
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between following his religion and receiving a government
benefit. The Bowen Court did not analyze the centrality of the
infringed religious practice. It noted, however, that while the
governmental interest was compelling, the religious practice was
not substantially infringed. In finding that the burden imposed
on the Native American family was minor, the Court thus implicitly regards that choosing to obey a Sabbath is more important than a religious belief in an individual’s uniqueness.
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATIONS THAT THREATEN THE EXISTENCE OF A PARTICULAR RELIGION.
The following cases illustrate the Court’s treatment of
governmental practices that are neutral on their face, but indirectly threaten the entire existence of religious practices.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, Wisconsin’s compulsory schooling law forced Amish parents to send their children to public
school after the eighth grade violating core Amish religious beliefs.37 Although this law was a neutral government regulation,
the Court applied the Sherbert test to find that Wisconsin’s law
would debilitate the continuance of the Amish faith and therefore unduly burden the free exercise of religion. 38 The Court
found that a regulation that is neutral in application may nonetheless “offend the constitutional requirement for governmental
neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.”39 In
Yoder, the neutral regulation ran afoul of the Free Exercise
Clause because its neutral application would have the effect of
debilitating the continuance of the Amish faith. The Court thus
expanded the scope of protection of the Free Exercise Clause.
In Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective Association,
the government proposed the construction of a six-mile road
cutting through a National Forest in northwestern California.40
Though the Forest Service’s expert was against building the road
because the area was viewed as indispensable41 to the religious
practices of three Native American tribes, the Forest Service
rejected that recommendation.42
The tribes initially achieved some success in the lower
courts.43 The district court acknowledged the centrality of the
infringed right to their religious practice44 and issued an injunction.45 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the granting of the
injunction, holding that the road construction did not further a
compelling state interest and violated the tribes’ free-exercise
rights.46
The Supreme Court reversed, distinguishing Lyng from
other cases where the indirect burden was found unconstitutional
in that they involved governmental coercion, while concluding
that Lyng did not.47 The Court said the First Amendment does
not involve what individuals can extract from the government;
rather it involves what the government is prohibited from doing
to the individual.48 Even if the road would destroy the tribes’
religion, the Court reasoned that because the governmental action did not “coerce” the tribes into violating their religious tenets, it did not sufficiently burden their religion.49
In rejecting the tribes’ claim, the Court also stressed
that the government has the prerogative to decide what to do
with its own land.50 It feared that recognizing the claim could
give rise to religious servitudes on government property, thereby
inhibiting the government’s ability to advance the public interest.51
The Free Exercise Clause did not protect Native
Americans from a governmental action that
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ing an undue burden on the free exercise of religion so long as
the law is otherwise valid and within the government’s prerogative to regulate.63 The Smith Court viewed accommodation of
The Lyng Court seemed to be holding that ostensibly religious minorities as preferring one religion over another. This
neutral laws that eliminate Native American religious practices accommodation would create a constitutional right to ignore
are constitutional so long as they are not an outright ban on the neutral laws of general applicability.64 Therefore, the Court depracticing of a religion. Both Yoder and Lyng involve govern- cided not to apply the compelling interest test that it had applied
ment policies that risked the destruction of a religion, yet only in in cases such as Sherbert and Yoder.65 Rather, a rational basis
Lyng was the government action found to be constitutional.52 for the regulation was sufficient to pass constitutional muster.
In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do
The difference in the outcome of these cases resulted from the
fact that the proposed action in Lyng involved government Vegetal, a small religious sect sought a preliminary injunction to
land.53 Therefore, the Lyng case can be interpreted to mean that prevent the federal government from enforcing a ban against
the First Amendment cannot be invoked to challenge the govern- using a hallucinogen regulated under the Controlled Substances
Act.66 The district court granted the injunction, and the Court of
ment’s use of real property.54
Indeed, this
Appeals affirmed.67
interpretation of Lyng
The court applied the Sherbert test because the fedwas expressed when the
eral government was seeking to impose restrictions
RFRA was passed in
that burden religious practice.68 Under this test, the
55
November 1993.
Government failed to show that it had a compelling
in not allowing an exception to the ConRFRA calls for the appliRFRA creates a right of action for interest
trolled Substances Act. Neither the evidence related
cation of Free Exercise
analysis from before individuals privately owning land, to diversion of the drug away from its religious use,
Smith, including cases but not when the federal government nor the evidence as to its adverse health effects was
strong.69 The Supreme Court affirmed noting that
such as Lyng, which reis
managing
federal
land.
fuse to extend judicial
RFRA expressly requires an individualized inprotection when governquiry.70 The Court also noted that the Controlled
ment action on federal
Substances Act does make an exception to halluland is at issue.56 Concinogens such as peyote.71
gress was thus not atThe Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in U.S. v.
tempting to change the
Hardman found that a governmental scheme aimed
way the courts interpret cases that deal with governmental land at restricting access to eagles’ feathers violates individuals’ Free
management. Yet, an express aim of RFRA was to create a right Exercise rights because the regulatory scheme was not the least
of action for individuals suffering infringement of their right to restrictive means possible to accomplish the government’s comfreely exercise their religious beliefs as a result of indirect, os- pelling interest.72 The regulatory scheme required a permit from
tensibly neutral, government action.57 Therefore, RFRA creates the federal government to collect eagles’ feathers.73 Only mema right of action for individuals privately owning land, but not bers of federally-recognized tribes could apply for this permit.74
when the federal government is managing federal land. MoreAs a preliminary matter, the circuit court found that
over, since Native American religious practice often occurs on because an eagle’s feather is sacred in many Native American
federal land, such practices will be subject to greater infringe- religions, any scheme limiting access to feathers substantially
ment than those who practice their religion on their own prop- burdened the free exercise of a religious belief.75 In addition,
erty. 58
the court also found that there was a compelling governmental
In Yoder, a government policy that risked the destruc- interest to combat spurious claims for eagles’ feathers and to
tion of a religion was found unconstitutional,59 yet in Lyng, a protect Native American culture.76 However, the government
government action that posed an even greater risk of this same never showed the nexus between preservation of this culture and
result was found constitutional.60 In Lyng, the centrality of the selectively allowing application for permits based on memberreligious practice at issue was recognized by the district court ship in federally-recognized tribes.77 The court found that testiand the substantiality of the burden was clear because experts mony in support of the notion that the prohibition would help to
believed the proposed action would damage an area viewed as preserve Native American culture was equally indicative of a
indispensable to the religious practice of three Native American tendency to cause its destruction since the ineligibility of adhertribes.61 However, because the proposed action was to occur on ents to apply for a permit could just as easily lead to poaching as
too long a waitlist.78 As a result, the court found that the regulagovernmental land, it was allowed.62
tion was not the least restrictive way to preserve Native American Culture. 79
In United States v. Tawahongva, the United States DisRELIGIOUS OBJECTS AND OBSERVANCES
trict Court for the District of Arizona found that a Native AmeriCase law has been inconsistent in its treatment of gov- can’s freedom to exercise his religion was not substantially burernment regulations affecting the use of objects that are used for dened by the government’s requirement that an individual seekreligious observances, but whose use is also regulated by a fed- ing to acquire an eagle’s feather apply for a permit.80 The court
eral regulatory scheme. This inconsistency continues even after admitted that the permit requirement substantially burdened the
passage of the RFRA.
free exercise of Native American religion in other cases. HowIn Employment Div. v. Smith, the Supreme Court held ever, rather than making a particularized inquiry as to whether
that neutral statutes are not unconstitutional by virtue of impos- the means of achieving the asserted governmental interest was
threatened a religious practice because of the
government’s interest in managing its land.
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the least restrictive possible, the Tawahongva court merely inquired as to whether the defendant’s burden was particularly
burdensome.81 The defendant only objected to the requirement
to apply for a permit from the Hopi tribal government, and did
not object to the need to apply for a permit in general. The court
concluded that the burden was not substantial for him.82 Even if
the burden was substantial, the court nevertheless determined
that the government has a compelling interest in regulating access to eagles’ feathers and the means used to accomplish it
were the least restrictive possible.
Judicial interpretation of RFRA
with regard to the use of religious
objects and religious observances
in the face of governmental regulatory schemes remains inconsistent.
In Smith, the Court rejected using the balancing test
from Sherbert and Yoder even though the regulation indirectly
burdened religion. The Court questioned neither the centrality
of the practice, nor the substantiality of the burden. Had the
Court undertaken the Sherbert and Yoder analysis, it likely
would have struck the government regulation for not being the
least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling interest.
Mainstream religions had for decades been protected
from governmental infringement of religious practice via Sherbert and Yoder’s analytical framework. Yet, the Court in Smith
eschewed that analysis in consideration of a burden imposed
upon a non-mainstream religion. After passage of the RFRA,
the O Centro Court overturned the governmental action in a case
factually similar to Smith. Thus, the RFRA can be understood to
convey greater protection for the free exercise of religion than
the Free Exercise Clause.
While the Hardman and Tawahongva courts both assumed that the infringed right was central enough to trigger an
analysis under the Free Exercise clause, the two courts differed
as to the substantiality of the burden imposed. This difference is
likely due to the Tawahongva court’s subjective inquiry on the
substantiality of the burden for the defendant. Therefore, the
Tawahongva court rejected the defendant’s claim even while
recognizing that the statute as generally applied substantially
burdens the free exercise of religion.83 This subjective RFRA
inquiry involved greater scrutiny of the defendant’s asserted
injury than courts ordinarily undertake in Free Exercise cases.
The RFRA protected non-mainstream religions use of
controlled substances for religious purposes. However, as in
Tawahongva, Native American tribes are still unable to freely
practice their religion as mainstream religions are.
CONFLICTS BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL MANAGEMENT OF
FEDERAL LAND AND RELIGIOUS PRACTICES.
Cases involving land use have traditionally been decided in favor of the government, and thus against the free exercise of religion by Native Americans. 84 Though the RFRA did
not appear to change this analysis, case law may be evaluating
Native American Free Exercise land use claims similarly to
mainstream religions.
In Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority upheld the
proposed governmental construction of the Tellico Dam on the
Little Tennessee River.85 Cherokee Indians claimed the dam
76

would flood their sacred homeland.86 The court found that, although the complaint asserted an irreversible loss of Cherokee
culture and history, these were not interests protected by the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.87
The Cherokee Indians failed to demonstrate that worship at Little Tennessee Valley was (1) inseparable from their
way of life; (2) the cornerstone of their religious observance; (3)
or that it played a central role in their religious ceremonies and
practices.88 The land at issue was, therefore, not the theological
heart of their religion and thus the Free Exercise clause did not
apply.
In Badoni v. Higginson, the Navajo sought to order the
government to lower a reservoir that partially flooded the Rainbow Bridge National Monument, a sacred site. 89 The tribe also
tried to compel the government to issue regulations controlling
tourist behavior at the monument; and to temporarily close the
monument to the public, on notice, for religious ceremonies.90
The court first noted that the government had a compelling interest in maintaining the level of the reservoir because it
supplied both water and electricity for the region.91 The court
next stated that a governmental action must be coercive in order
to potentially violate the Free Exercise Clause.92 Here, the government was not forcing the Native American groups to do anything that was against their religion, nor depriving anyone of a
governmental benefit for failure to take an action that was abhorrent to their religion. Finally, because the plaintiffs were
seeking to compel the government to prevent the public from
accessing areas of religious significance, the court reasoned that
taking such action would violate the Establishment Clause.93
In Wilson v. Block, the Navajo and Hopi Indians sought
to enjoin the clearing of fifty acres of forest to expand the Snowbowl ski resort in the Coconino National Forest in Northern Arizona.94 However, they failed to show a substantial burden upon
their religious practices.95 To show a substantial burden, unlike
in Sequoyah, this court did not require that the religious practice
be central to the religion. Nonetheless, it required that the affected religious practice could not be performed elsewhere.96
The Wilson Court then considered whether the AIRFA
protected the tribes from the proposed expansion.97 Based on
the legislative record, the court found that AIRFA did not create
any additional rights. Rather, it merely required federal agencies
to consider the impact of proposed regulations and actions upon
Native Americans.98
More recently, in a similar dispute the Ninth Circuit in
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service overruled the Arizona District Court’s finding that the proposed expansion of the Snowbowl ski resort was constitutional under the First Amendment.99
Contrary to the district court, the circuit court held that the proposed action constituted a substantial burden on the free exercise
of religion. Moreover, it also held that the government did not
have a compelling interest in the expansion of the Snowbowl ski
resort.100
The owners of the ski resort and the government were
seeking to expand the size of the resort and introduce artificial
snow-making.101 Although artificial snow-making expanded the
ski season, it also entailed the use of treated sewage effluent.102
The circuit court found that the proposed use of sewage effluent
would be a burden of the highest order upon the tribes’ right to
freely exercise their religion.103 The court noted that a burden
must prevent the plaintiff from “engaging in religious conduct or
having a religious experience” in order to trigger RFRA analysis.104 Here, the proposed expansion would severely burden the
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religious exercise of the Hopi and Navajo because it polluted the elsewhere.116 Since the religious activity could be conducted
most sacred place of those tribes. Since their religious practices elsewhere, the infringement did not violate the free exercise of
require pure natural resources, use of the treated sewage effluent religion.
would prevent the Navajo from conducting some ceremonies
The Navajo Nation Court, however, defined a substanand would undermine the Hopi’s entire system of belief.105
tial burden upon the free exercise of religion as actions preventThe circuit court agreed with the district court in that ing an individual from “engaging in religious conduct or having
the government in general has a compelling interest in managing a religious experience.”117 This definition is broader than the
public recreational land. However, it argued that O Centro re- definitions provided by the Sequoyah, Badoni, and Wilson
quires a more particularized compelling interest analysis than courts. A potential explanation for this more inclusive definition
the lower court employed. Under that analysis, expanding the is that the Navajo Nation case occurred after passage of the
size and operating season of a ski resort that is located in the RFRA.
desert is not a compelling governmental interest.
The Navajo Nation Court noted that the term ‘exercise
The government also argued that it had a compelling of religion’ is defined more broadly under RFRA in distinguishinterest in developing snow-play areas for non-skiers. Without ing cases that allowed governmental activities that gravely imthese areas, non-skiers were having accidents by playing close to pacted Native American religious practices.118 Before, the Free
the road. 106 The circuit court rejected this argument because Exercise Clause analysis examined whether an action prohibited
nothing in the trial record indicated that these safety concerns the free exercise of religion. Under the RFRA analysis actions
had any relationship to expansion of the resort.107 The circuit merely burdening the free exercise of religion may violate Free
court found that even if creation of a snow-play park was a com- Exercise rights.119
pelling interest, introducing artificial snow-making and expandThe circuit court differentiated the Lyng and Wilson
ing the resort were not the least
decisions because of this greater protection
restrictive means of furthering
provided by the RFRA and also on factual
such an interest.108
differences.120
These land use cases
The owners of the resort
hinged on the definition of what was a subalso argued that complying with
stantial burden on the free exercise of rethe Establishment Clause was a
In Native American Free Exercise ligion. Therefore, while RFRA does not
compelling governmental interthe method of determining when a
jurisprudence, courts have required change
est.109 Therefore, in furtherance
substantial right is infringed, its interpretaof this interest, the government a higher showing that a practice was tion in Navajo Nation marks a post-RFRA
should not accommodate Native substantially burdened than in cases land use case that protected Native American religious practices.
American religious practices.110
involving mainstream religions.
However, the circuit court noted
that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Constitution
ANALYSIS AND PREDICTIONS
requires accommodation, rather
than mere tolerance, of all religThis section will review federal court interions.111 The circuit court viewed refusal to allow the proposed pretation of when religious practices are protected from governexpansion as a “permitted accommodation to avoid callous in- ment actions or regulations; when governmental action substandifference.”112
tially infringes such a right; and what constitutes a compelling
governmental interest. Finally, it will predict the direction of
The post-RFRA Navajo Nation defederal court jurisprudence in light of the Navajo Nation decicision interprets burdens upon the
sion.
free exercise of religion more
broadly than the pre-RFRA caselaw.
INTERPRETATION OF KEY ISSUES
These land use cases hinged on the definition of what
was a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. For
example, the Sequoyah Court did not view destruction of the
Cherokee’s ancestral lands as a substantial interest protected by
the First Amendment.113 Rather, to find a substantial burden it
examined whether the infringed practice was (1) inseparable
from a way of life; (2) the cornerstone of a religious observance;
or (3) central to religious ceremonies and practices.114 Since the
destruction of the Cherokee’s ancestral lands did not fall under
any of these categories, the governmental action did not violate
the Free Exercise Clause. The Badoni Court analyzed the substantiality of an imposed burden via whether or not the act or
regulation is coercive.115 Since the governmental act was not
coercive, the Court did not find it in violation of the free exercise of religion. Also, the Wilson Court analyzed substantiality
by asking whether a given religious practice could not be done
Special - Fall 2008

In Native American Free Exercise jurisprudence, courts
have required a higher showing that a practice was substantially
burdened than in cases involving mainstream religions. In Free
Exercise cases regarding mainstream religions, courts ordinarily
decline any ability to measure the centrality of a religious practice.121 In many Native American Free Exercise cases, however,
courts have required the Native American group to prove the
centrality of the religious practice. For example, for mainstream
religions, it has sometimes been sufficient that a religious practice be in any way affected by a governmental act.122 Conversely, in Tawahongva, the court subjectively examined the
claimant’s burden even when, in general, the act substantially
burdened the free exercise of religion.123 Other courts have required that a given practice could not be done elsewhere. Only
when these high substantial burden requirements were satisfied
would the courts be willing to apply the compelling interest test
77

analysis.124
However, even when this test is applied, courts are
quicker to find both a compelling interest and that the government engaged in the least restrictive means of accomplishing
this interest in cases involving the government’s management of
federal land.125 Such an approach negatively impacts Native
American religious practice because Native American sacred
sites are often located upon federal land.

FREE EXERCISE AND THE RFRA GOING FORWARD
Post-RFRA cases only addressing what the First
Amendment prohibits the federal government from doing miss
the point. The RFRA increases the prohibitions on what the
federal government can do through the requirement that the government pursue its aim by the least restrictive means possible.126
Cases that fail to recognize that the RFRA protects a broader
range of conduct are also misguided because RFRA’s expansive
definition of ‘exercise of religion’ includes “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of
religious belief.”127
The RFRA was amended in 2000 upon passage of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”) of 2000 to change the understanding of the term
‘exercise of religion.’128 While the RFRA previously relied on
the Court’s understanding of the term as required by the First
Amendment, RLUIPA expanded its meaning.129
Finally, based on Navajo Nation’s different interpreta-

tion of the RFRA, courts may in the future analyze Native
American Free Exercise cases in the same manner as the Free
Exercise cases of mainstream religions. Such an interpretation
of the RFRA would provide greater protection of Native Americans’ rights to freely practice their religion. RFRA restored the
method of analysis from before Smith130 when mainstream religions received more protection than Native American religions.131
Therefore, the RFRA alone would not seem to increase protection for the free exercise of Native American religious practices
in the land use context.132
However, Navajo Nation used the RFRA framework
with the RLUIPA definition of ‘free exercise of religion’ to protect the rights of Native Americans. The Navajo Nation court
seriously questioned the government’s asserted interest in expanding a ski resort and protected sacred Native American land
from destruction. Also, contrary to previous cases, Navajo Nation did not examine the individual’s ability to have this experience elsewhere or the coercive nature of the governmental action.133 Rather, it analyzed whether the government had prevented an individual from “engaging in religious conduct or
having a religious experience.” Therefore, if Navajo Nation
indicates a change in the way courts will evaluate governmental
burdens on Native American religious practices, then Native
American religious practices may receive the same level of accommodation as mainstream religious practices in the future.
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